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 THE CONTOURS 
OF LOSS 
 Naomi Mandel 
 Lost Bodies: Inhabiting the Borders 
of Life and Death by Laura E. 
Tanner. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2006. Pp. 264. 
$21.00 paper. 
 In  Lost Bodies , Laura Tanner exam-
ines the philosophical, epistemo-
logical, and conceptual challenges 
that personal loss poses to prevail-
ing discourses of grief. Taking as 
its focus photographic images, lit-
erary and nonliterary texts, and 
commemorative objects like the 
AIDS Memorial Quilt,  Lost Bodies 
explores “how cultural constructions 
of death and grief are inextricably 
bound with specifi c assumptions 
about the body” (4). What, asks 
Tanner, can the  lost body—the 
wasting body of the terminally ill, 
the absent body of the deceased—
tell us about our own bodies and 
our embodied experience of the 
world? Contemporary U.S. culture, 
she argues, disavows the absent 
body by narrativizing grief as re -
covery, by aligning bereavement 
with survival, or by depicting the 
deceased as present in another, 
better place. This dynamic of dis-
avowal is informed by a fi ction of 
disembodiment—a psyche unfet-
tered by materiality and corporeal-
ity and a body that is autonomous, 
healthy, and invulnerable. Dis-
avowing the absent body precludes 
examining how our bodies are 
intertwined with the bodies of oth-
ers and prohibits acknowledging 
that loss is a physical phenomenon, 
as well as a psychological one. 
 “Cultural constructions of death 
and grief” is a very broad topic, and 
Tanner draws on an array of disci-
plines to approach it. She references 
recent work in disability studies 
and studies of aging to trouble the 
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distinction between the healthy and 
the dying; she relies on work in 
psychoanalysis and phenomenology 
to highlight the role of the body (or 
the implications of its absence) 
in perception and experience; she 
employs the methodologies of cul-
tural studies and of sociology to 
expand the scope of her discussion 
beyond the literary; and she pays 
special attention to photography. 
Throughout, Tanner mobilizes her 
considerable talents in literary anal-
ysis to explore “the way in which 
the body of illness or grief is absent 
from critical discourse and lost to 
cultural view” (2). As this formula-
tion indicates, hers is a conceptu-
ally tricky project—demonstrating 
the presence of the body’s absence—
and Tanner treats its challenges 
as an opportunity for close, careful, 
eloquent, and sometimes down-
right brilliant readings of images, 
texts, spaces, and objects.  Lost 
Bodies alternates between brief 
discussions—some only a few pages 
long—of novels, short stories, con-
dolence cards, the AIDS Memorial 
Quilt, the medical waiting room, 
and the HBO series  Six Feet 
Under (2001–5)—and more exten-
sive engagements with poetry by 
Sharon Olds and Mark Doty; nov-
els by Marilynne Robinson, Caro-
lyn Parkhurst, and Don DeLillo; 
Roland Barthes’s autobiographical 
meditations in  Camera Lucida (1980); 
and the photography of Billy 
Howard, Nicholas Nixon, and 
Shellburne Thurber. Throughout, 
Tanner argues that the body and 
its loss, like embodiment and per-
ception, are fundamentally inter-
twined. Given that we experience 
through our interactions with the 
tactile world, the body we can no 
longer touch calls into question both 
experience and world; focusing on 
representations of and approaches 
to the lost body throws both pre-
vailing discourses of the body and 
the stakes of these discourses into 
high relief. 
 Tanner has an eye for nuance; 
her writing is rigorous but accessi-
ble, and her analysis illuminates 
each text she discusses. In the course 
of this book these discussions do 
become somewhat repetitive—one 
gets the sense that Tanner is enjoin-
ing us, again and again, to “see what 
is not there” (173). More problem-
atic is the book’s conceptual trajec-
tory, which moves too quickly from 
illness to death and from loss to 
grief; and its theoretical scaffold-
ing, which relies on Merleau-Ponty 
and Freud at the expense of more 
recent work and advances, without 
explicitly saying so, a quite vehe-
ment critique of the image and 
of the power dynamics of vision. 
Finally, though Tanner describes 
 Lost Bodies as a critical engagement 
with “assumptions about embodi-
ment and mortality in contempo-
rary American culture” (3), she 
never explains what is uniquely 
American about the assumptions 
she explores. Most of the artists 
and authors she discusses are U.S. 
nationals (an obvious exception 
is Roland Barthes, whose  Camera 
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Lucida is treated as a primary text), 
but this fact does not suffi ce to 
anchor references to “[c]ontempo-
rary American culture’s insistence 
on isolating and disavowing the 
bodily dimensions of illness and 
grief” (3) and fails to explain just 
how, or why, “American culture 
touts the consolation of memory 
and image as an answer to loss” 
(89). The lack of such self-refl exivity 
becomes sadly clear when Tanner 
turns, in the “Postscript,” to the 
events of 11 September 2001. 
 Readers familiar with Tanner’s 
previous work (her fi rst book, 
 Intimate Violence , focused on the 
dynamics of reading fi ctional rep-
resentations of violence) will rec-
ognize in  Lost Bodies Tanner’s 
privileging of experience over and 
above its representation and discur-
sive mediation, and her investment 
in an embodied reading practice by 
which the reader realizes the extent 
to which she is complicit with 
the discursive regime that the text 
reproduces and enforces, a realiza-
tion that, in itself, grounds an ethical 
response.  Intimate Violence aimed 
to “subvert the disembodying ten-
dencies of the reading process in 
order to . . . remind the reader of 
his or her own violability.” 1  Lost 
Bodies , which expands the reading 
process from fi ction to images, 
objects, and institutional spaces, has 
a similar goal: to dissolve the dis-
tinction between the ill or absent 
body and the self in order to rede-
fi ne that self as embodied, subject 
to fragmentation and mortality. 
 This work has clear social, insti-
tutional, and ethical stakes. “Criti-
cal attention to the construction of 
embodied subjectivity in illness 
and in grief,” writes Tanner, is “a 
form of caring for the vulnerable 
body” (10), and invites a kind of 
resistance to cultural forces that 
render that body invisible: “think-
ing about the way we know . . . in 
and through the body allows us to 
resist the pressure of immaterial-
ization that would exclude palpa-
ble, multisensory experience not 
only from the realm of knowledge 
in general but from our under-
standing of grief in particular” (209). 
The formulation of these objec-
tives (critical attention is a form of 
caring; thinking allows us to resist) 
sits uneasily with Tanner’s commit-
ment to materialism and avowed 
pragmatism; given the compelling 
nature of this material and the 
urgency and passion with which she 
approaches it, her reluctance to 
move from describing a problem to 
proposing a solution is frustrating. 
Ultimately, Tanner remains content 
to do what she does well: “revealing 
the strategies through which we 
have attempted to relegate the body 
to the position of subject or object—
extension of thought or mere 
thing—rather than recognizing the 
way its very existence blurs and 
complicates those categories” (5). 
 The arc of the book follows Tan-
ner’s own experience of her father’s 
death, moving from a focus on the 
critically ill body in part 1 (“The 
Dying Body”) to an examination of 
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the processes of mourning in part 2 
(“The Body of Grief”). This struc-
ture is designed to perform the 
trajectory of her argument: the 
dying subject becomes the object of 
mourning’s discourse, and Tanner’s 
focus on the dying body in the fi rst 
part of the book lays the ground-
work for the longer second part, 
which is an approach to grief that 
is predicated not on the grieving 
subject’s survival but on the fact of 
the lost body’s absence, “at once the 
most obvious fact of grief and at the 
same time the most unspeakable” 
(84). The structure of the book mir-
rors its topic: the body’s presence, 
its absence, and “the dynamics 
of absent presence” (95), through 
which Tanner examines the phe-
nomenon of loss. Unlike absence 
(with which it is too easily con-
fl ated), loss presupposes a specifi c 
object, stressing that object’s pres-
ence  as absence. Furthermore, given 
that the object is perceived by the 
body, its absence is experienced 
in corporeal terms as well. Rather 
than attempting to resolve this par-
adox (the palpable presence of the 
corporeal body’s absence), Tanner 
dwells on—or within—it, holding 
tenaciously to the material quality 
of loss, refusing “the cultural force 
that pulls us out of our bodies and 
pushes us to reconstitute ourselves 
through language, metaphor, and 
image as continuously whole,” 
and choosing rather to inhabit the 
uneasy space between the two (92). 
 This is a daunting prospect, as 
it requires maintaining the tension 
between lived experience and its 
inevitable appropriation by medi-
ating discourses, but Tanner treats 
this challenge as an opportunity 
to generate elegant and insight-
ful readings of texts, objects, and 
images. Her discussion of Shell-
burne Thurber’s images of empty 
or abandoned spaces, for example, 
maintains “the tension between 
absence and presence” in order to 
show how Thurber’s photographs 
“evoke absent bodies that never 
existed as presences for the viewer” 
(116), and she reads individual pan-
els on the AIDS Memorial Quilt 
with an eye to how the objects on 
the quilt, present precisely because 
of the body’s absence, evoke the 
body that wore, used, played with, 
or cherished them. 
 The most effective moments of 
 Lost Bodies are when Tanner extends 
loss’s intertwining of absence and 
presence to the imagery and lan-
guage that dominate prevailing dis-
courses of grief. Reading Marilynne 
Robinson’s  Housekeeping (1980) with 
an eye to the incontrovertible fact 
that Ruth cannot touch her dead 
mother or be touched by her, for 
example, Tanner uncovers the rad-
ical implications of being  literally 
“out of touch”: “the experience of 
grief locks [Ruth] away from the 
tactile world and questions the pres-
ence not only of her mother’s body 
and her own but of those around 
her” (102). In the case of the AIDS 
Memorial Quilt, “the spatial and 
material dimensions of objects on 
the quilt complicate the process of 
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their signifi cation by continually 
returning us from the realm of the 
symbolic to an understanding of 
the way in which things mark and 
are marked by an embodied use” 
(202). Her brief but compelling dis-
cussion of Alice Sebold’s immensely 
popular novel  The Lovely Bones 
(2002) reveals the pernicious qual-
ity of “a logic that invokes embodi-
ment only to metaphorize it” (202): 
through its reliance on symbols and 
images that compensate for physi-
cal violation (“the lovely bones” of 
the title is a metaphor for the social 
connections that form in the wake 
of a child’s rape and murder), the 
novel evokes and authorizes dis-
courses that, by disavowing both 
the body’s experience and the expe-
rience of its absence, relocate expe-
rience to the immaterial. 
 Tanner is at her best in such close 
readings, dwelling on each nuance 
of the text—be it a photograph, 
literature, literary theory and phi-
losophy, or her own experiences 
of illness and grief—and offering 
analyses that are luminous, elo-
quent, and often exquisite. And yet, 
I could not but be troubled by Tan-
ner’s confl ation of loss with death 
in her treatment of illness, which is 
represented exclusively by terminal 
cancer and terminal AIDS. Attend-
ing only to terminal illness—as if 
a diagnosis of cancer or of HIV + 
were a death sentence—misses 
the myriad ways people live with 
illness and its losses outside the 
dominating narrative of grief. Re-
presentations of the disabled as 
grieving for health is one of the 
most consistent targets of critique 
in the fi eld of disability studies, and 
 Lost Bodies , which draws on dis-
ability studies in its emphasis on the 
corporeal dimensions of experience 
and in its challenge to paradigms 
of selfhood defi ned by autonomy 
and agency (3), moves too quickly 
to assume that illness results in grief 
(for health or for life). The book 
thus risks perpetuating fundamen-
tal cultural assumptions about the 
disabled that scholars like Lennard 
Davis and Rosemarie Garland-
Thomson have urgently worked 
to undo. 
 The book’s theoretical parame-
ters lie at the intersection of dis-
courses about the subject and 
subjectivity on the one hand and 
theories of the body on the other. 
Taking her cue from Elizabeth 
Grosz’s and Gail Weiss’s work 
on corporeality and embodiment, 
but primarily referencing Merleau-
Ponty’s revision of Cartesian dual-
ism and his identifi cation of the 
body as the subject, not the object, 
of perception, Tanner focuses on 
“the way that the sensory particu-
larity of our lived existence shapes 
and defi nes our relationships to 
one another and our experience of 
the world” (8). She usefully extends 
the scope of Merleau-Ponty’s inves-
tigation by pointing out that, for 
Merleau-Ponty, the body in ques-
tion is a living, healthy, present body. 
What, asks Tanner, can we learn 
about experience, subjectivity, and 
the body when the body is or will 
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be  absent ? If the very self-evidence 
of sentience challenges critical dis-
course about self-evidence and 
about sentience, the dead and dying 
body catapults sentience, corpo-
reality, materiality, and the body 
itself into radical uncertainty. 
 Against Merleau-Ponty’s para-
digm of embodiment, Tanner posits 
Freud’s “Mourning and Melancho-
lia” (1917), which stands for “defi -
nitions of mourning which disavow 
the embodied dynamics of grief” 
(4). Tanner aligns herself with 
Kathleen Woodward and Michael 
Moon, who have expressed reser-
vations about Freud’s treatment 
of grief as something to be quickly 
overcome and disposed of rather 
than explored. She situates her own 
discussion of Freud as an answer 
to Woodward’s call to supplement 
Freud’s theory of mourning with 
a theory of grief (92–93), pointing 
out that the psychic work Freud 
describes neglects the embodied 
aspects of experience: “At no point 
does Freud address the way in 
which the subject’s relationship to 
the lost object is constituted  through 
the body as well as through the 
psyche” (94, original emphasis). 
 As Tanner mobilizes her phe-
nomenological approach to lay bare 
how grief troubles Freud’s distinc-
tion between the lost object’s pres-
ence (in memory) and its absence 
(in reality), the dynamics of pres-
ence and absence emerge as the 
conceptual foundation for Tanner’s 
underlying distrust of the image: 
“If we understand presence as 
 embodied presence,” writes Tanner, 
“. . . Freud’s model is complicated 
by memory’s limited ability to cap-
ture the multisensory experience 
of a lost body” (95, original emp-
hasis). Memory’s ability is limited 
because, as Tanner puts it, “memo-
ry’s images have no bodies” (95), 
and it is this conceptualization 
of the image in terms of the body’s 
absence that will emerge, in the 
course of  Lost Bodies , as the book’s 
unstated agenda: a critique of the 
dynamics of vision and “contem-
porary image culture” (174), which, 
Tanner insists, play a special role in 
causing the lost body to “disap-
pear[] from cultural view . . . along 
with the sensory traces of its corpo-
real presence” (2). 
 By opposing an epistemology of 
the body (represented primarily by 
Merleau-Ponty’s work in the 1960s) 
to psychoanalytic theories that dis-
avow it (represented primarily by 
Freud’s 1917 essay), Tanner misses 
some important opportunities to 
situate her discussion within more 
contemporary work. Her emphasis 
on the experiential quality of psy-
chic states ignores recent work 
on affect by Sara Ahmed, Brian 
Massumi, Lauren Berlant, and Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick, each of whom 
traces the inextricability of corpo-
real experience from representa-
tional dynamics. Her privileging 
of Freud’s work on mourning also 
raises the question of the potential 
relevance of melancholia to this 
study. In “Mourning and Melan-
cholia,” Freud opposes mourning, 
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which he associates with the reality 
principle, to melancholia, which he 
dismisses as a pathology, because 
the melancholiac, unlike the mour-
ner, holds tenaciously to the lost 
object. Tanner’s attention to “the 
grieving subject’s refusal to move 
past the fact of the absent body” 
(134) seems to evoke Freud’s defi -
nition of melancholia. And yet, she 
pays no attention to the term or 
to work on melancholia by Judith 
Butler, Julia Kristeva, and especially 
David Eng and David Kazanjian, 
whose edited collection  Loss: The 
Politics of Mourning appropriates 
Freud’s concept of melancholia to 
focus on “embodied losses” and to 
ask “how the productive constraints 
of melancholia materialize bodies.” 2 
 If the book’s structure enacts 
Tanner’s argument about the body 
and its loss, it also refl ects her dis-
trust of the power dynamics of 
vision, a distrust that extends to the 
image as such. Part 1 approaches the 
dying body as the object of an em-
powered, disembodied, “healthy,” 
or “medical” gaze that reduces the 
patient to the bearer of a disease 
(a paradigm that Tanner borrows 
from Foucault’s  Birth of the Clinic 
[1963]). Tanner asks whether look-
ing at a person with terminal ill-
ness may complicate these power 
dynamics: “Because the object of 
the gaze announces not only dif-
ference but sameness, the subject’s 
recognition of a shared mortality 
lends power to the very threat that 
the healthy gaze would dispel” (24). 
Against the healthy gaze, Tanner 
posits an “embodied gaze” that 
eschews omniscience and “dissolves 
the subject/object dynamics of the 
gaze until the healthy subject is 
forced to acknowledge its own mor-
tality” (39). She reads Sharon Olds’s 
account of her father’s death from 
terminal cancer as the articulation 
of such a gaze: a deathwatch in 
which, as Tanner poetically puts it, 
“the watcher becomes the watched” 
(39). In her discussion of medical 
waiting rooms, Tanner draws on 
her own experience and on repre-
sentations of medical waiting rooms 
in literature and memoir to dem-
onstrate that the panoptic quality 
of this liminal space “disrupts the 
motion of even the healthy sub-
ject’s gaze by turning it back onto 
the self” (78), so that “the gaze that 
might otherwise maintain the illu-
sion of absolute distance between 
the subject and object of the look 
reveals itself as originating in a 
body” (79). Her discussion of Billy 
Howard’s 1989  Epitaphs for the 
Living and Nicholas Nixon’s 1991 
 People with AIDS traces how pho-
tography’s representational con-
ventions negotiate an impossible 
economy of physical form on the 
one hand and embodied subjectiv-
ity on the other—this economy is 
impossible because the photographs 
either reduce the person with AIDS 
to a suffering body or disavow the 
physical manifestations of the dis-
ease. “As long as the gaze sees as 
its object a diseased body but not 
the diseased person’s experience 
of embodiment, the look only 
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perpetuates the experience of dis-
location,” writes Tanner (60); “pho-
tographic representations [of subjects 
who suffer from AIDS] must con-
tinually invent ways of subverting 
visual conventions, not only those 
that code the unmarked body as 
‘healthy’ but those which would 
transcend the embodied dynamics 
of subjectivity or reduce the repre-
sentational subject to an unfamiliar 
object” (63). 
 While part 1 performs an explicit 
critique of the subject/object dynam-
ics that underlie these visual con-
ventions, the second half of the book 
expands this critique to what Tan-
ner calls, perhaps too hastily, “con-
temporary image culture” (174). 
Referencing Sartre’s defi nition of 
the image as that “which is absent 
from perception,” “an unreality,” 
and “a mirage” (quoted in Tanner, 
89), Tanner locates within the image 
“cultural assumptions about grief 
that deny the role of the body in 
loss” (87). In a powerful reading of 
James Agee’s  A Death in the Family 
(1957), Tanner convincingly dem-
onstrates how the dead body’s object 
status demands that it be accessed 
only visually; touch (with its con-
notations of intimacy and care) is 
profoundly inappropriate in this 
context. The experience of grief, 
then, demands that sight replace 
touch, rendering the absent body 
(physically) inaccessible and the 
desire for it (socially) unspeakable. 
The subsequent discussion identi-
fi es images as the site wherein 
the body is granted an illusion of 
presence that only underscores its 
absence: images “fail, of necessity, 
to hold onto the lost body in all 
its texture and specifi city,” writes 
Tanner (116); “understanding grief 
as an embodied experience demands 
acknowledgement not just of the 
failure of . . . images to render the 
body present, but of their sustain-
ing contribution to the taunting 
rhythms of grief” (89). She reads 
Roland Barthes’s  Camera Lucida as 
an account of the grieving narra-
tor’s “poignant but unsuccessful 
attempts to offset the failures of the 
visual image” (115); in Marilynne 
Robinson’s  Housekeeping , “images 
gesture toward a lost body that the 
image cannot hold and the mourner 
cannot touch” (103); Shellburne 
Thurber’s photographs of empty 
and abandoned domestic spaces tes-
tify, again and again, to “the limi-
tations of the image” (116, 127). 
 Clearly, then,  Lost Bodies offers 
a resolute, if implicit, critique of 
the power dynamics of the gaze 
and of the visual image’s illusion of 
presence. This critique extends from 
the image in particular to represen-
tation as such: the image is aligned 
with representation against the 
body and its experience. “Given the 
image’s primarily visual quality, 
its failure to hold onto the textured 
experience of the lived body exag-
gerates its already mediated repre-
sentational status,” writes Tanner 
(95); “depictions of grief,” she states 
elsewhere, “often become entan-
gled with explorations of the act of 
representation” as they confront 
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“the failure of both the promise of 
representation and the culture of 
simulation to speak to the embod-
ied dynamics of loss” (134). This 
opposition of the image and repre-
sentation to the body and its expe-
rience testifi es to the moral and 
ethical stakes of Tanner’s project: 
“to rescue the materiality of the 
body from those who would situ-
ate it entirely within the realms of 
discourse” (7). But the effi cacy of 
such a project is limited, and not 
only because Tanner relies on Sartre 
at the expense of recent work by 
Vivian Sobchack and Brian Mas-
sumi, each of whom has treated 
vision in corporeal and experiential 
terms (Sobchack’s book  The Address 
of the Eye [1992] employs Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology to highlight 
the material quality of spectatorship; 
Massumi’s  Parables for the Virtual 
[2002] models an approach to the 
body and its sensations that eludes 
the structural account of subject 
formation that opposes the subject 
to discourse) but because, as the book 
progresses, what Tanner means 
by “image” becomes increasingly 
unclear. In her discussion of Bar-
thes’s  Camera Lucida and Robin-
son’s  Housekeeping —both of which 
“document the failure of the image 
to hold onto the specifi city of a 
missing body” (116)—“image” refers 
to a memory, a photograph, and a 
literary device, all within the space 
of two sentences: Ruth is left with 
“with a head full of images,” Barthes 
with “a handful of glossy paper,” 
and the reader of  Camera Lucida 
with the “image of Barthes . . . turn-
ing not to embrace another body but 
to dance with the beloved image” 
(114–15). As Tanner’s discussion 
moves to Carolyn Parkhurst’s  The 
Dogs of Babel (2003), Don DeLillo’s 
 The Body Artist (2001), and Mark 
Doty’s long poem “The Wings” 
(1993), “image” comes to mean any-
thing and everything that might 
pose a challenge to embodied expe-
rience in “an age of images” (227). 
 Perhaps because the conceptual 
blurriness of “image” causes  Lost 
Bodies to lose focus, I was especially 
disappointed by Tanner’s engage-
ment, in the “Postscript,” with the 
events of 11 September 2001, which 
she reads as an attack on “Ameri-
ca’s image culture” (223). Tanner’s 
main objective here is to explore 
“how we, as a culture, name and 
understand a loss the ‘lived experi-
ence’ of which most of us can claim 
but cannot embody” (226). Given 
 Lost Bodies ’ self-proclaimed U.S. 
context, her approach to 9/11 seems 
to be motivated by a mandate to 
extend the claims of the body’s expe-
rience to (but not beyond) the body 
politic. She focuses on attempts, by 
Americans, to create proximity or 
intimacy with the dead, and con-
cludes by suggesting that “our expe-
rience of September 11 . . . creates 
the possibility of experiencing as 
absence something we as a culture 
naturalize as presence: the force 
of embodiment and, consequently, 
the power of its loss” (236). 
 The “Postscript” is prefaced with 
a statement to the effect that a book 
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entitled  Lost Bodies must perforce 
address 9/11 (222). This may be so, 
but this fact alone does not justify 
so sudden an extension of “the force 
of embodiment” from person to 
culture, nor does it justify limiting 
“culture” to U.S. culture. A more 
effective approach might have ref-
erenced related meditations on how 
loss navigates the relation of the 
body to the body politic. Judith 
Butler’s  Precarious Life suggests 
that “each of us is constituted polit-
ically in part by virtue of the social 
vulnerability of our bodies . . . Loss 
and vulnerability,” writes Butler, 
in a move that Tanner might have 
found useful, “seem to follow from 
our being socially constituted bod-
ies, attached to others, at risk of 
exposing those attachments, exposed 
to others, at risk of violence by vir-
tue of that exposure.” 3 In her quest 
for “a language that addresses the 
signifi cance of September 11 with-
out abstracting the materiality and 
specifi city of overwhelming loss” 
(222), Tanner might also have had 
recourse to Ahmed, whose  Cul-
tural Politics of Emotion (2004) 
explores the interpenetration of 
individual bodies and social bod-
ies, especially in the aftermath of 
9/11, or Eng and Kazanjian, whose 
collection examines “not only how 
bodies see and hear losses but also 
how specifi c sociohistorical losses 
see and hear bodies.” 4 Neither 
Ahmed nor Eng and Kazanjian 
limit their purview to the United 
States. 
 Alternately, Tanner might have 
used these concluding pages to revise 
and expand her narrow defi nition 
of loss as the loss of a body, and the 
body as the body of a beloved.  Lost 
Bodies is about a very specifi c kind 
of loss: “the kind of loss that tears a 
loved one away from a parent, child, 
or lover” (101); its scope is limited 
to what happens in the wake of “the 
unfolding of two bodies once inter-
twined” (88). But need “a corporeal 
theory of grief,” one that would 
“acknowledge and respond to the 
way the loss of . . . feeling shapes 
the feeling of loss” (84), be confi ned 
solely to the loss of “a living, 
breathing child, husband, mother, 
or friend” (104)? After all, in 
“Mourning and Melancholia” Freud 
defi nes mourning as “the reaction 
to the loss of a loved person,  or 
to the loss of some abstraction which 
has taken the place of one [emphasis 
mine], such as one’s country, liberty, 
an ideal, and so on.” 5 I’m sympa-
thetic to Tanner’s distrust of abstrac-
tion in the face of personal loss, but 
the loss of a home to fl ooding, the 
loss of a homeland to war, loss of 
language to exile, loss of faith, loss 
of solvency, loss of health, loss of 
hope—each is manifested in and 
through the chiasmic intertwining 
of body and world that Merleau-
Ponty delineates and on which 
Tanner’s project of “theorizing 
embodiment through the category 
of the experiential” (222) relies. 
 —University of Rhode Island 
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